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A B S T R A C T
Evidence has the potential to be misleading if its value when expressing beliefs in hypotheses is not fully un-
derstood or presented. Although the knowledge base to understand uncertainties is growing, a challenge remains
to prioritise research and to continuously assess the magnitude and consequences of misleading evidence in
criminal cases. This study used a systematic content analysis to identify misleading evidence, drawing in-
formation from case transcripts of rulings argued unsafe by the Court of Appeal of England and Wales. In the 7-
year study period, 218 applications were successful on appeal, containing 235 cases of misleading evidence. The
majority (76%) of successful appeals were based upon the same materials available in the original trial, rather
than the presentation of new relevant information. Witness (39%), forensic (32%), and character evidence (19%)
were the most commonly observed evidence types, with the validity of witnesses (26%), probative value of
forensic evidence (12%), and relevance of character evidence (10%) being the most prevalent combinations of
identiﬁed issues. Additionally, the majority (66%) of misleading evidence types relate to their interpretation at
activity level. The ﬁndings suggest that many of these misleading aspects could have been prevented by pro-
viding more transparency in the relationship between evidence and hypotheses. Generally, the results contribute
to gaining a more complete picture of the role of misleading evidence in the criminal justice system.
1. Introduction
Uncertainty is an inherent characteristic of many forensic analysis
and interpretation processes. Therefore, advancing the role that the
growing forensic knowledge base can play throughout the criminal
justice system requires an understanding of how uncertainties are
currently being dealt with and whether this is improving over time.
This coincides with the signiﬁcant number of concerns discussed in
various government-led reports, highlighting the need for research on
the scientiﬁc validity of methods, judgements, and presentation
methods in court [1–3]. As will be discussed in the following sections,
empirical research has increasingly focused on these topics, either by
testing the validity of methods in experimental settings or by studying
processes in mainstream casework, although a lack of studies high-
lighting the nature and signiﬁcance of problematic evidence remains
[4–7]. More speciﬁcally, the UK government has stated:
“It recognises the potential value of the proposed reliability test in re-
ducing the risk of unsafe convictions arising from unreliable expert evi-
dence. However, there is no robust estimate of the size of the problem to
be tackled – either in terms of the number of cases where unreliable
expert evidence is adduced, nor in the impact this has in terms of sub-
sequently quashed convictions.” [8]
This study begins to address this gap by systematically assessing the
nature, extent, and consequences of ‘unreliable expert evidence’ in legal
rulings in England and Wales, by studying the wider issue of misleading
evidence within any ruling overturned by the Court of Appeal. More
generally, it presents a method which is applicable to other legislations
and of which the results can be used to not only develop methods to
avoid evidence being misleading in the future, but also to identify
possible cases in which it has not surfaced yet.
1.1. ‘Unreliable expert evidence’ and uncertainties
When forensic evidence is used throughout a criminal investigation,
it is assumed to have some relation to the criminal act, and therefore
has some ability to support the reconstruction of related events. More
speciﬁcally, analysing an item of evidence aims to determine the value
of parameters of this observed evidence (e.g. the refractive index of
glass) which can subsequently be used in the interpretation stage to
express a belief in hypotheses (e.g. possible sources). However,
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variation may exist between the true and observed parameter value,
impacting subsequent interpretations [9,10]. Such variation depends
upon the method's accuracy or systematic error (determined by the
speciﬁcity (true negative rate) and sensitivity (true positive rate), to-
gether with a threshold above which the method can be called ‘reliable’
[11]), as well as on information on its precision or random error (their
repeatability and reproducibility) [3,12]. In addition, factors may in-
ﬂuence parameter values post-event, such as environmental conditions
and collection strategies [13,14]. ‘Unreliable expert evidence’ then re-
lates to the extent to which the meaning of the uncertainty caused by
such factors are and can be considered in the interpretation and pre-
sentation stages of the forensic science process.
A growth in empirical research allows for greater understanding of
such uncertainties. For example, studies have highlighted factors in-
volved in the dispersion, transfer, and persistence of many diﬀerent
trace evidence types including GSR and trace DNA [15,16]. Ad-
ditionally, a growing body of research has focussed on sources of po-
tential bias in the analysis processes of domains which rely upon
methods with subjective aspects, such as handwriting analysis [17] and
the analysis of skeletal remains [18]. Moreover, in addition to the
growing analysis of error rates using past cases [19–21] a recent shift
can be observed, integrating blind testing programmes within main-
stream case examinations [22]. Current interpretation and presentation
processes have been the focus of research after identiﬁcation of mis-
interpretations of the frequency of features in populations, including
those of ﬁngerprints [23,24], hair [25], and bullet‑lead [26], and sev-
eral high proﬁle cases triggered research into the misleading aspects of
statistical evidence [27,28]. However, despite the growing knowledge
base, uncertainties will remain and so does the need to acknowledge
these and understand their eﬀects.
1.2. Misleading evidence and unsafe rulings
Failing to acknowledge some of the discussed uncertainties that are
associated with the evaluation of hypotheses (either due to a lack of
knowledge or a misinterpretation) may result in an erroneous under-
standing of the evidential value of evidence, which, if suﬃciently sig-
niﬁcant, results in “reporting support for a hypothesis that is not true”
[22] while reporting opposition for a hypothesis that is true (to avoid
misleading interpretations where evidence could also support an hy-
pothesis that is true (e.g. a partial mark has common features with
multiple prints [29]). Within a legal setting, rulings have been argued
unsafe following the identiﬁcation of issues which in retrospect could
have changed the decision of the Trier-of-fact (Criminal Appeal Act
1995). The term ‘misleading evidence’ will be used here to simply re-
ﬂect any evidence presented which misled or had the potential to
mislead decision-makers in the truth-ﬁnding process.
Many studies into unsafe rulings focus on individual or small sets of
high-proﬁle cases [30], such as those in England and Wales [31], the
Netherlands [32], and Switzerland [33], often presenting speciﬁc re-
commendations following the outcome of each case. Some of the ear-
liest more extensive empirical-based studies have reported issues re-
lated to eyewitnesses, informants, bad character, ﬁngerprint forgeries,
faked autopsies, and an inadequate defence [34–40]. Although it has
been argued that knowledge is still lacking to draw strong inferences
about the relationship between forensic evidence and wrongful rulings
[8,11], many of the more recent published studies on wrongful con-
victions include sections on the role of forensic evidence. An overview
has been compiled for this study, see Table 1. Public attention rose in
the USA by post-conviction DNA testing through the Innocence Project
[41], which has been referred to as the beginning of “the age of in-
nocence” [42]. This lead to both the acceptance that wrongful convic-
tions happen, as well as a growth in research identifying its causes and
developing reforms [43] through the use of more solid data sets [11]. In
many of the studies in Table 1, non-DNA evidence was initially used to
narrow down the pool of suspects in what was later argued to be
beyond what was scientiﬁcally valid [36]. In the decade that followed,
studies aimed at highlighting the general severity of problems with
forensic evidence [6,44], while others aimed more speciﬁcally in ca-
tegorising these issues [45,46], fuelling the debate on who to blame for
these consequences; bad lawyering [47] or bad forensic science [45].
More recently, comparative studies have been performed, recognising
‘forensic error’ [48] and the amount of evidence types at the trial [49]
as predicting factors of unsafe convictions. What the results presented
in Table 1 mostly show is that wrongful convictions are not always just
an issue of ﬂawed science or bad lawyering, but rather, ﬂawed com-
munication and interpretation [45,47], an issue both sides should take
responsibility for.
1.3. Present study: a structural approach in understanding misleading
evidence
The idea that evidence has the potential to be misleading
throughout an investigation and in court is represented in Fig. 1. This
study aims to contribute to understanding the nature of misleading
evidence, by presenting and implementing a systematic content ana-
lysis, to comprehensively infer the nature of misleading evidence from
concerns expressed by appeal judges on the safety of trial rulings (the
overlapping area in Fig. 1) in the Court of Appeal of England and Wales.
The results will provide insights in both the type of evidence that is
misleading (e.g. witness statements or DNA) as well as the nature of this
misleading evidence (e.g. the evidence was not reliable or relevant). Of
speciﬁc interest is whether the issues could have been known and
subsequently could have been avoided in the trial. A greater under-
standing can drive subsequent research, allowing us to draw more
general inferences about the complete set of misleading evidence in
Fig. 1, to include those who have not been recognised and to avoid
similar issues in the future [30,35,59].
For the purpose of the study, we assume that the ‘correct’ rulings are
those based upon the judgement of the appeal court judges, as the
ground-truth cannot be known other than by running test-cases through
the system. Additionally, allowing for the possibility that there are
unsafe rulings which have not been recognised as such [11,30], the
results can be used as a (highly liberal) snapshot of the current situation
(assuming that rendering a ruling as unsafe is generally justiﬁed).
Moreover, although it has been suggested that the frequency of (known
or revised) errors of justice is relatively low compared to all convictions
[30], the disutility of even a single wrongful ruling is extremely high.
2. Materials and methods
Previous research suggests that valuable information can be drawn
from structural research on the outcomes of casework [9]. In order to
structurally study case documents of wrongful rulings to make valid
inferences on the underlying themes, a content analysis approach was
used [60,61]. The steps that were undertaken include a systematic case
selection, case coding, testing of coding reliability, and analysis of re-
sults [62].
2.1. Case selection
The cases used in this study are a convenience sample of all relevant
cases, accepting that this only includes misleading evidence identiﬁed
through the used overturned rulings (see Fig. 1) [60]. Although it has
been argued that there is a lack of information on appeal outcomes
[63], exacerbated after the discontinuation of Casetrack, appeal deci-
sions were gathered from the Westlaw UK database. They were selected
from the case analysis documents on the basis of having been heard by
the Criminal Court of Appeal of England and Wales (EWCA Crim, fur-
ther referenced as ‘AC’), and having been labelled with criminal evidence
according to Sweet &Maxwell's Legal Taxonomy [64]. The dataset was
further limited to appeals allowed with regards to the conviction or
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acquittal (rather than the sentencing), as this was believed to provide
more information on signiﬁcant misleading evidence, following a belief
by appeal judges that the trial ruling was unsafe (outlined in the
Criminal Appeal Act 1995). The study term (of the appeal rulings) was a
7-year period January 2010 through December 2016.
2.2. Coding categories and considerations
This study aimed to identify the basis for the successful appeal (i.e.
the reason why the trial conviction was unsafe), which is of a de-
scriptive nature and reﬂects simply the statement of the appeal judge
(In Vivo) rather than a normative evaluation of whether that reason was
justiﬁed. Coding categories were determined using three diﬀerent
methods, combining deductive and inductive techniques. Firstly, codes
were developed a priori based upon the results from previous studies
presented in Table 1 and the admissibility and criteria of evidence from
the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act
1984. Examples include issues with the validity of collection and ana-
lysis methods, and the determination of the relevance and probative
value of evidence. Secondly, the coding framework was adjusted to
categorise the issues based upon the possibility of developing methods
to further understand and avoid these issues in the future. The most
important aspect was diﬀerentiating between whether there was new
evidence, whether the trial evidence had been re-evaluated by an ex-
pert, or whether the decision had been overturned without new evi-
dence. Lastly, the framework was reﬁned through the identiﬁcation of
inductively deﬁned codes from analysing the case documents [61,62].
Added categories include, for example, procedural errors, inconsistent
decisions by the jury, and insuﬃcient directions by the judge on the
relevance of evidence. The ﬁnal coding scheme is reﬂected in the de-
cision scheme in Fig. 2. The following terminology reﬂects some of the
detailed coding categories:
∙ Issues with the relevance of the evidence have to do with the ques-
tion whether it can be of value to address the hypothesis (e.g. and
therefore should have been excluded/included).
∙ When considering the probative value of evidence, it is agreed that
the evidence was relevant but it was misleading with respect to how
much/little weight was given to the evidence.
∙ The validity of the evidence is used to categorise evidence which was
argued by the appeal judge to not be (presented) accurately or
precisely.
2.3. Case attributes
Together with the nature and type of the (misleading) evidence,
attributes such as the appeal outcome, requests for re-trials, involve-
ment of the Criminal Case Review Commission (CCRC), trial dates, and
proposition levels were also considered.
2.4. Inter-coder reliability
To determine the reliability of the coding method, an inter-coder
agreement index was developed based upon the coding of the nominal
categories of the initial and two additional independent coders (as the
initial coder was involved in the development of the coding rules which
could impact the reliability [65]), by determining Krippendorﬀ's alpha
coeﬃcient [60]. The additional coders were given 20% of the total of
cases studied and only relied upon the coding instructions presented in
Fig. 2 and the appeal court transcripts. They were required to identify
the type of evidence questioned in the trial (and new evidence in the
appeal if present), and the nature of why it was misleading (the chosen
category following the coding procedure).
3. Results and discussion
3.1. Signiﬁcance: number of cases
In the 7-year period between 2010 and 2016, 10,859 cases were
found in Westlaw UK as having been heard in the Court of Appeal of
England and Wales. Of the 996 cases which involved criminal evidence,
rulings in 218 cases (22%) were argued unsafe because they contained
misleading evidence, representing the shaded area in Fig. 1. Details of
these cases are shown in Table 2. As argued previously by others
[11,47,48], this study also suggests that the actual occurrence of mis-
leading evidence is higher. It is possible that many cases are not in-
cluded in the study sample, either because they have not gone into
appeal or because, although errors are identiﬁed, they were not argued
to “undermine the safety of the conviction” (e.g. see [2015] AC 1619 or
[2016] AC 4, or where evidence was argued in the light of new evi-
dence, to be ‘neutral’, see [2010] AC 2936). Logically, however, un-
derstanding these issues is of great importance as such errors could
potentially contribute to unsafe rulings in other contexts.
Despite the number of cases of misleading evidence found in this
study, the challenge with the method developed for this study as
compared to most of those discussed in Table 1 (which study already
known unsafe rulings), is that only approximately 1 in every 5 in-depth
studied cases (22%) heard in the Court of Appeal is rendered unsafe.
Because of this, studying all unsafe cases or all cases where forensic
evidence is present to determine desired rates in Fig. 1 is not feasible.
Such results would require the need for more automated approaches of
analysing the large number of case material – something that can only
be explored once a more detailed picture exists of misleading evidence
in case transcripts as produced for this initial study.
3.2. Further signiﬁcance: time between rulings
The signiﬁcance of the 223 overturned counts becomes more per-
tinent when considering the time between the original conviction and
the decision by the appeal judges. This time diﬀerence in cases where
this could be obtained (n=208) averaged 2.9 years but with a wide
range (sd=5.7 years). Eighteen rulings took over 10 years to be over-
turned, with a maximum time diﬀerence of 36.3 years (in [2014] AC
2047, which was quashed due to fresh evidence indicating police
malpractice). Moreover, the method of data collection allowed for more
detailed analyses. For example, comparing the median of the time
diﬀerence (interquartile range) of 2.7 (1.3−9.7) years for rulings
where new evidence had to be obtained with the 0.8 (0.5−1.3) years
for rulings which were overturned without having to acquire new evi-
dence, shows a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two distributions
(Mann–Whitney U=5684,nnew=47,nnotnew=179,p < 0.001, two
− tailed). This is consistent with the length of time it would take to
acquire and consider new evidence in a case.
It followed from the case documents that of the 201 overturned
convictions, no re-trial was ordered in 80 cases (in addition to 24 re-
trials and 97 unknowns). Additionally, re-trials were requested
Fig. 1. Diagram showing the present study sample (overlap), a sub-sample of all mis-
leading evidence, obtained though studying overturned unsafe rulings.
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following all 10 acquittals (including resumed proceedings), a possibi-
lity after the double jeopardy ban in the UK in 2003 (Criminal Justice
Act 2003), see for example [2012] AC 414. In 10 cases, no re-trial was
ordered as the conviction was substituted (e.g. murder to man-
slaughter). More generally, the time between the rulings does not al-
ways correspond with the time spent incarcerated, as, for example, the
suspect may have been incarcerated before the trial date or have al-
ready completed their sentence before the appeal. The cases involved
signiﬁcant crimes, including those related to sexual assault (n= 50),
assault (34), murder (28), robbery (18), fraud (13), and drug oﬀences
(13). Nevertheless, whether a suspect was ultimately guilty or not does
not change the fact that misleading evidence was still present in these
trials in the ﬁrst place.
3.3. Coding method reliability
The coding method reliability has been studied by determining the
inter-coder agreement on 20% of the total number of cases coded for
this study, resulting in a Krippendorﬀ's alpha coeﬃcient of 0.772 (47
subjects, 3 coders). This has been suggested as ‘substantial’ agreement
Fig. 2. The coding scheme used in this study to classify the reasons for rendering the trial ruling unsafe by the Court of Appeal judge(s).
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[66], although others argue that above 0.8 would be considered reliable
[60]. The coeﬃcient presented here is, however, a conservative
agreement as all categories are considered equally diﬀerent, while is-
sues with, for example, the probative value or the relevance are
somewhat similar and not always easy to distinguish from the case
transcript. This does indicate that perhaps a more detailed explanation
of the coding categories and/or the reasoning of the judge could be
valuable.
3.4. Overview of the results in each coding category
Overturns of 213 of the 223 counts were based upon a single key
reason related to a single evidence type, highlighting the importance of
avoiding any type of misleading evidence in trial cases. The major and
minor categories in which the reason for the unsafe ruling was classiﬁed
using the coding method (see Fig. 2) can be found in Table 3. It follows
that in a minority of instances (24%) there was entirely new evidence or
newly gained knowledge (such as a re-evaluation by a forensic expert)
which led to the unsafe ruling. In the majority (76%) of cases, however,
the ruling was overturned given the same set of information available in
the trial. These results do strongly suggest that there might be many
more unsafe rulings beyond the post-conviction DNA testing cases
summarised in Table 1. Additionally, from the 22 cases which were
successful on appeal following a reference by the CCRC (according to
the transcripts), the majority (15 cases) were rendered unsafe due to the
introduction of new evidence. This, again, suggests that perhaps not
enough focus is directed on cases where there is not necessarily new
evidence.
The reasons for why the evidence is misleading are studied from the
point of the trial evidence. On the 19 occasions where there was new
evidence which was relevant on its own (mostly witnesses (n= 4),
documents (3), medical evidence (3), and DNA (2)) and the 9 cases
where there was an absence of evidence, no trial evidence was ques-
tioned. Additionally, there was no speciﬁc evidence associated with the
unsafe ruling in some instances where there were issues with the di-
rection given by the judge (n= 6), general errors (4), and issues with
the decision of the jury (4). The remaining 193 reasons related to trial
evidence are studied further. Here, the remaining cases where there was
new relevant information questioning the trial evidence (c in Table 3)
are considered together with the nature of the evidence as presented in
court (a) as they both relate to the nature of the trial evidence, and only
diﬀer in the way the issue came to light (n= 122). Moreover, the issues
with the direction of the judge (b) indicate a misunderstanding of this
similar nature of the evidence (n= 54), an issue also identiﬁed by
others [56]. The presence of these revised categories is studied with
respect to the evidence type groups shown in Fig. 3.
It follows from Fig. 3 that witness (including victim) statements are
the most problematic evidence type (39%), which has also been sug-
gested as a major cause for concern by other scholars [30,50,57]. The
second most-common evidence type is the grouped category of forensic
evidence (32%), which will be a major focus of the subsequent sections.
Although discussions have been ongoing as to whether (good and bad)
character evidence (19%) has a higher risk of convicting the innocent
and/or whether the underlying assumptions are fair towards a suspect
[67], especially as after becoming more easily admissible after the
Criminal Justice Act 2003, research did not ﬁnd evidence of unfair
prejudice [68]. The ﬁnal two evidence types are police- and suspect
statements. While false confessions have been identiﬁed as a signiﬁcant
factor in wrongful convictions in the USA [30] and can generally have a
major impact in an investigation [69], this study has only found four
such cases, and are therefore either less common or were not identiﬁed
in the present study. The four general reasons in Fig. 3 are grouped in
two sets and discussed in Sections 3.5 and 3.6.
3.5. Issues with the nature of the evidence
The two major categories related to the nature of the evidence are
responsible for the majority of the overturned reasons found in this
study (n= 176 or 75%), see Fig. 3. In other words, the common theme
is that of possible erroneous beliefs in hypotheses in the light of such
misleading evidence. In order to improve this process, it is necessary to
understand what type of hypotheses are addressed with this evidence.
This allows for the possibility to develop further knowledge bases with
respect to each evidence type, such as within- and between source
characteristics and evidence dynamics. The ﬁndings with respect to the
Table 2
Details of the 218 successful appeal cases between 2010 – 2016 as extracted
from Westlaw UK. A total of 996 relevant cases were studied.
N
Successful appeal cases 218
Rulings (suspects) 222
Conviction quashed
Conviction substituted
Acquittal quashed
Admission of evidence allowed
201
10
10
1
Counts 223
Items of evidence 230
Reasons for misleading evidence 235
Table 3
Overview of the results of each coding category from Fig. 2 representing the reason for
the unsafe ruling.
Coding category representing the reason for unsafe ruling n (%)
a. Misleading nature of the evidence as presented in court 85 (36%)
Relevance 31
Probative value 18
Validity 17
Hearsay 16
Independence 2
Collection 1
b. Issues with the direction of the judge on 60 (26%)
Probative value 18
Standard of proof 17
Relevance 14
Validity 10
Independence 1
c. There is new relevant information 56 (24%)
New questions validity trial 26
New is relevant stand-alone 19
Expert re-evaluation of probative value 7
New questions probative value trial 3
Expert re-evaluation of collection method 1
d. General errors by prosecution (6), police (2), or court (10) 18 (8%)
e. Absence of evidence in the trial 9 (4%)
f. Issues with the decision of the jury 7 (3%)
235
Fig. 3. An overview of the evidence type groups and the reasons given why the evidence
was misleading. 42 reasons did not speciﬁcally apply to an evidence type and are not
included in this graph.
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hypotheses in question in each case are shown in Table 4.
It follows from the ﬁndings presented in Table 4 that the majority
(116 or 66%) of items of evidence were used to address hypotheses
related to an activity level, such as witnesses describing violent acts of
suspects, victims describing sexual oﬀences by suspects, or cases where
evidence of bad character was used as evidence that a suspect was more
likely to commit certain acts. The results highlight the importance of
understanding trace evidence dynamics and the value and limitations of
observing evidence such as DNA, ﬁngerprints, and GSR when addres-
sing these activity level hypotheses. Moreover, cases where there was a
dispute about the lower, source level, hypotheses, were also commonly
encountered whereby the evidence of witnesses and forensic evidence
were misleading. In the remaining cases, the evidence was used to as-
sess the validity of other evidence (this is not the same as issues with
the validity in Table 3) and used to determine whether or not intent was
involved.
The ﬁnal step in moving forward and addressing these issues by
developing and better employing the forensic knowledge base is the
need to understand the misleading aspect of the relationship between
the evidence and the hypothesis. For example, was the evidence simply
not relevant for the hypothesis? Was it given too much evidential
weight? Or was the evidence itself not valid and therefore problematic
for assessing the truth in the hypothesis? These results (using the sub-
categories in Table 3) are shown in Table 5, grouped per general evi-
dence category and hypothesis level (from Table 4). It follows from
Table 3 that 16 cases were categorised as hearsay, following, for ex-
ample, the argument that because a witness could not be cross-ex-
amined, the possibility of assessing their reliability was severely di-
minished ([2012] AC 1509). These cases were therefore categorised as
questions on the (general) validity of the evidence. The three cases
categorised under issues with the independence of evidence were rendered
unsafe because of underlying issues of validity (whereby an identiﬁ-
cation was inﬂuenced by possible biasing information) and probative
value (where two dependent items of evidence were presented as pro-
viding independent support for an hypothesis).
3.5.1. Relevance of evidence
First of all, the evidence must be relevant for hypotheses (Police and
Criminal Evidence Act 1984). With regards to the character evidence,
this assessment was the major issue, mainly whereby bad character was
‘unfairly’ used as evidence that a suspect could have committed a
criminal act. Evidence deemed irrelevant for the hypothesis in question
was also observed in relation to several forensic evidence types, in-
cluding cases where the presence of drugs was arguably wrongly used
as evidence to support hypothesis in relation to handling or dealing
(other types of) drugs (e.g. [2013] AC 901 and [2012] AC 2879).
In order to avoid such misinterpretations, it is crucial to deﬁne sub-
hypotheses which are perhaps more clearly associated with the re-
covered evidence to provide transparency in the reasoning process. For
example, when the presence of marijuana is used as evidence for
dealing heroin, a sub-hypothesis can be deﬁned on the dealing of
marijuana, and how this is linked with the presence of marijuana on the
one hand, and the dealing of heroin on the other. These relationships
can then be assessed separately but interpreted as a whole.
3.5.2. Probative value of evidence
After evidence is considered relevant for an hypothesis, the belief
expressed in an hypothesis (with respect to another) is sometimes
presented disproportionately to the actual probative value of an item of
evidence. This issue was most often related to the forensic evidence
(59%), and was also the major issue within the forensic evidence (53%).
Examples on the activity level include medical evidence such as trauma,
argued to be conclusive of penetration ([2012] AC 1433) or non-acci-
dental trauma ([2010] AC 2847), which were on appeal revised con-
sidering new scientiﬁc ﬁndings. Within trace evidence, the appeal
highlighted questions such as those regarding the time when DNA was
deposited ([2015] AC1732), to what extent the location of DNA
([2011] AC 460) and ﬁngerprints ([2010] AC 2421) were suggestive of
the criminal act, the possibilities of multiple transfer of blood ([2010]
AC 2499), and the exact meaning of small quantities of GSR on clothing
([2014] AC 2507). Similarly, the appeal court rendered convictions
unsafe where disproportionate weight was given to evidence when
addressing questions of identiﬁcations or individualisations on a source
level. Appeal rulings suggested the need to consider possible sources of
glass unconnected to the crime ([2015] AC 1950), the misleading as-
pect of the trial judge failing to direct the jury about the meaning of a
partial DNA proﬁle ([2010] AC 1334), the importance of recognising
disputes between ﬁngerprint experts ([2011] AC 1296), and severe
limitations in the notorious case of R. v T when determining the source
of a shoe print ([2010] AC 2439).
In addition to identifying sub-hypotheses clarifying the relation-
ships between evidence and hypotheses, determining the change in
belief in an hypothesis following the evidence requires an in-depth
analysis of the factors that can inﬂuence the state of the evidence given
Table 5
Overview of the number of cases of misleading evidence and the detailed relationship
between the diﬀerent levels of hypotheses (see Table 4) and the nature of the misleading
evidence, grouped by general evidence category.
Misleading nature
Relevance Probative
value
Validity Standard of
proof
Witness evidence 8 14 60 3 85
Activity 4 7 35 2
Source 6 22 1
Validity 3 1 2
Intent 1 1
Forensic evidence 13 29 7 6 55
Activity 10 19 5 5
Source 1 8 1 1
Validity 2 1 1
Intent 1
Character
evidence
24 6 4 2 36
Activity 20 4 3 2
Source 1 1
Validity 3 1 1
45 49 71 11 176
Table 4
Overview of the number of cases of misleading evidence and the type of hypothesis that
they addressed.
Hypothesis related to
Activity Source Validity Intent
Witnesses evidence 48 29 6 2 85
Police 2 3 5
Suspect 9 1 2 1 13
Other witness 37 25 4 1 67
Forensic evidence 39 10 4 1 55
Animal blood 1 1
Digital 3 1 4
DNA 4 4 8
Documents 11 1 12
Drugs 5 1 1 7
Fingerprints 4 2 6
Footwear marks 1 1
Glass 1 1
GSR 1 1
Handwriting 2 2
Medical 7 1 8
Weapon 3 1 4
Character evidence 29 2 5 36
116 42 15 3 176
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the speciﬁc hypothesis. As argued previously, it requires an extensive
knowledge base on the factors inﬂuencing the dynamics of evidence
and the abundance of observed characteristics. Such datasets can be
generally developed, but it should be made clear under what assump-
tions these are applied in a case context and how this impacts the in-
terpretation.
3.5.3. Validity of evidence
When considering the witness statements, issues were most often
associated with regards to their validity (e.g. the credibility of a wit-
ness). Although the validity of evidence is not directly linked to the
relationship between evidence and an hypothesis (as compared to the
relevance and probative value), a decrease in the validity of the evi-
dence (whether it is the accuracy or precision) can, again, cause a
misinterpretation of the probative value or relevance of the evidence
(although these latter assessments could be justiﬁed themselves).
In relation to the witness statements, and to a lesser extent the
character and forensic evidence with a questionable validity (including
ﬁngerprints, handwriting evidence, and digital evidence), it is pertinent
that the factors inﬂuencing the validity are understood. These include,
for example, the conditions under which the witness observations have
been made (e.g. distance, weather) and the degree of subjectivism of
forensic analysis methods and factors which can inﬂuence this process
(as discussed in the introduction). Judges and jurors should be made
aware of these eﬀects and their implications for the belief in hy-
potheses, as they generally tend to consider forensic evidence as quite
reliable [70].
3.5.4. Standard of proof
One of the roles of the judge is to direct the jury on the standard of
proof [71]. Part of this belief is an understanding of the factors dis-
cussed previously in this section. However, some of the issues do not ﬁt
in these categories and are related to the standard of proof more gen-
erally. Examples not related to a speciﬁc evidence type (see section 3.4)
include a lack of direction by the judge on what hypotheses they had to
be sure of before they could convict (e.g. [2016] AC 1632). Moreover,
the 11 cases where there was speciﬁc evidence (Table 5), the direction
on the standard of proof related both to source and activity level hy-
potheses. It was, for example, argued that the judge failed to direct the
jury that they could reach their own conclusions on the meaning of low-
template DNA evidence ([2010] AC 549), and that the judge did not
direct the jury on the law related to circumstantial drug-related evi-
dence ([2015] AC 1733). Overcoming these issues from the point of the
interpretation of the forensic evidence will mostly relate to a trans-
parent presentation of the hypotheses the jury needs to assess, the
uncertainties of the presented analyses or interpretations, and, together
with that, an indication that the jury a) should reach their own con-
clusions based on these uncertainties and b) the extent to which the jury
should be ‘sure’ of its conclusion.
3.6. General issues and the decisions by the jury
In addition to the nature of the evidence which is (or has the po-
tential to be) misleading in the truth-ﬁnding process, it follows from
Fig. 3 that in 14 cases there were ‘general issues’ with the evidence,
including procedural errors by the court, failures to disclose statements
by the prosecution to the defence, and breaches of code by police of-
ﬁcers. These only form a small proportion of all cases and would require
a more in-depth analysis of research targeted at these issues. Ad-
ditionally, three cases were overturned where the appeal judges argued
that the decisions of the trial jury were either logically inconsistent or
where there was no possibility for them to reach a conclusion properly
(e.g. [2010] AC 130). Although it is diﬃcult to evaluate the fairness and
reasonability of the decisions of a jury, research has shown a variation
in jurors' interpretation of the evidence following, for example, factors
that might inﬂuence the validity of eyewitnesses [72], the so-called CSI-
eﬀect [73], conditions aﬀecting the interpretation of probabilistic evi-
dence [74,75], and a change in the method of presentation (e.g. qua-
litative versus quantitative) of identiﬁcation evidence [76]. Therefore,
some of the requirements needed to improve the interpretation of for-
ensic evidence that follow from the results in this paper should coincide
with results from juror decision-making studies.
4. Conclusion
Content analysis of appeal court transcripts can provide vast in-
formation on the presence and nature of misleading evidence. Although
the sampling method causes a danger of over-analysing the data pre-
sented in this study, it does suggest that the relevance, probative value,
and validity of evidence are often misunderstood and mis-
communicated within a criminal trial when expressing beliefs in
(competing) hypotheses. The consequences of these are severe and have
caused many defendants to be wrongfully incarcerated. The results
show that these issues can be addressed by clarifying sub-hypotheses on
source and activity levels and by developing the knowledge base on, for
example, the rarity of observed characteristics in a population and the
factors aﬀecting evidence dynamics. The fact that most of these rulings
are overturned without including new evidence in the appeal suggests
that they could have been avoided in the trial if these interpretations
were improved. Accepting that uncertainty will remain present, it is
important that the uncertainties are not caused by erroneous arguments
and judgements but by inherent properties of the knowledge base,
which, in turn, can be presented transparently.
The ﬁndings from this research support previous ﬁndings that the
identiﬁed cases are only the tip of the iceberg and can no longer be
attributed to simple individual “bad apples” in the system [77]. This
study provides a foundation of detailed issues related to the inter-
pretation of forensic evidence and highlights the possibility of identi-
fying these issues from case transcripts, fuelling the important debate
on improving access to case documents post-conviction [78]. On the
one hand, the ﬁndings from this research can be validated by studying
and improving the understanding of uncertainties involved in assessing
the relevance, probative value, and validity of evidence on a more
comprehensive level for individual evidence types. This also includes
the use of methods to guide decision-making under uncertainty and
with new information, such as Bayesian networks [79–81]. On the other
hand, there is great potential in applying similar methods to larger scale
studies within England and Wales as well as in other jurisdictions,
using, for example, more automated text-mining techniques. These can
also be used to determine potential predicting factors of misleading
evidence (see for general examples [48]), using speciﬁc factors related
to the type of evidence and the type of hypotheses they address. The
ﬁndings in this paper suggest that, as others have argued, “the scientiﬁc
community can take the lead in reform eﬀorts” [55]. It is therefore
hoped that this research becomes more than just an “academic exercise”
as these datasets grow, and that these results allow for the much-needed
continuous evaluation of the use of forensic evidence in court and their
contribution to both justiﬁed and unjustiﬁed rulings.
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